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1 Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) is known today as the first American philosopher,
and as  the ‘founder  of  pragmatism.’  Indeed,  Peirce  was  both and much more.  In  a
partial list of roles he played during his life, Peirce graduated as a chemist, published as
an astronomer, worked in geodesy, wrote as a philosopher, and defined himself as a
logician.  While  he  gained  only  a  partial,  late  recognition  in  his  time,  today  the
broadness of his interests is reflected by the diversity of the people that refer to him,
either for scholarly study or for inspiration. The 21 essays constituting Su Peirce provide
an overview of  Italy’s  scholarship  on Peirce’s  philosophical,  semiotic  and historical
thought. 
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2 The essays were originally presented in a series of meetings organized by the Psòmega
Club for the centennial of Peirce’s death at the University of Milan and the Polytechnic
University of Milan. They are organized into four sections: an introductory one (“On
the meaning of Peirce: Three Introductions”) and three thematic ones (“Understanding
Peirce: Perspectives and Problems,” “Peirce and Others: Philosophy and Semiotics,” and
“Peirce  beyond  Peirce.  Inquiries  and  Problems”).  Contributions  range  from  close
analysis to traditionally philosophical topics in Peirce – such as the idea of externality
(Calcaterra),  reality  (Brioschi),  Kantianism  (Maddalena),  logic  and  phenomenology
(Stango, Paolucci), language (Fadda) – to dialogical engagement with different thinkers
– as with Vailati (Facchi), Lady Welby (Petrilli), Husserl (Silvestri), Saussure (Martone),
Hjelmslev  (Caputo),  Bachtin  (Ponzio),  Lacan  (Cimatti)  –  and  to  multidisciplinary
discussions  in  the  direction of  applied  philosophy.  In  this  last  section,  the  authors
tackle  the  problems  of  historical  testimony  (Pisanty),  the  social  situatedness  of
creativity  (Goldoni),  experience in  the working practice  (Proni),  and abduction and
projects in design theory (Zingale). Bonfantini closes the volume with a reflection on
contemporary issues in light of a ‘pragmatic historical materialism.’
3 Despite the diversity of the fields of engagement, I detect a strong philosophical unity
beneath the 21 essays in this volume, namely in the quest for a Peircean anthropology.
The obvious reference here is to Kant. Anthropology, for Kant, is the study that aims at
answering the question on what man is (“Was ist der Mensch?” – Logik Jäsche, 1800; AA
IX) through the careful observation of man’s actions. The role of actions becomes even
more pivotal  in Peirce’s  philosophy.  Dispositions towards action and expectation of
outcomes describe not only the attitude of the inquirer (“The Fixation of Belief,” 1877),
but also the purposive self-control of the moral man (“What Pragmatism Is,” 1905). 
4 In the following, I  will  offer a brief account of the many essays that constitute the
volume, focusing on how the idea of a pragmatist anthropology emerges from their
different perspectives.
5 Bonfantini, Eco, and Fabbrichesi open the volume with three introductory essays. While
Eco and Bonfantini provide a connection with the history of Peirce’s reception in Italy,
Fabbrichesi programmatically opens the debate towards the future and uses Peirce as a
tool “Towards the possibility of a New Pragmatic Anthropology.” In this, her essay fits
very nicely within Bonfantini’s presentation of Peirce’s philosophy as an open system
of knowledge (“A Guess at the Riddle,” c.1889, CP 1.1): Peirce’s declared hope is that his
philosophical work may be general enough that any particular sciences could fit in (13).
Indeed,  Fabbrichesi  draws on biology (Gilber,  Sapp, & Tauber 2012) as well  as from
Peirce’s  philosophy for  her  discussion of  man as  a  socially  rather  than individually
defined being. Her article also relates to Calcaterra’s contribution, in that Fabbrichesi
discusses a social  and external perspective on the self  from later writings of Peirce
(“What Pragmatism Is,” 1905, EP2, and a paragraph from MS R 403, c.1893, quoted in De
Tienne 2005), while Calcaterra focuses on the early papers “New List of Categories,”
1867, and “Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man,” 1868.
6 Bonfantini’s introduction is quite helpful in presenting chronologically Peirce’s most
famous philosophical and semiotic writings. The early “New List” (1867) is the point of
departure  and the  leading  aim  of  philosophical  inquiry:  to  find  concepts  general
enough that they may be used by any other philosopher as well as by any person in the
ordinary operations of reasoning. Those general concepts are thus termed ‘categories,’
elucidated in the anti-Cartesian essays of 1868, the “Illustrations of the logic of Science”
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of 1877-8, the reflections on continuity and mind of 1892 and evolutionary love (Peirce
1893: 15-9). Bonfantini’s final recap of the scope of the “New List” and its integration
with  phenomenology  and  phaneroscopy  highlights  the  novelty  of  those  later
reflections (20) but misses the opportunity to draw the reader’s attention to MS R 403
(c.1893) – an explicit rewriting of the 1867 early “List” (EP1: 1). Indeed, as far as I know,
the implications of this for the evolution of Peirce’s thought remain to be explored. 
7 Eco’s contribution is a reworking of his thesis of ‘primary iconism,’ first exposited in
his 1997 Kant and the Platypus. Eco’s effort in the 1997 book aimed at demonstrating the
reality content of the semiotic experience: “My thesis was that, if one defends a theory
of interpretation, and precisely because of that, then one must also concede that there is
something that can be interpreted” (23). With this, Eco openly declared his positive
intentions: his aim was that of supplementing Peirce’s theory with a possible answer to
the problem of finding a ground for reality. Peirce’s explicit refusal of a first start of our
knowledge of reality – a key-aspect of his philosophy, as pointed out by Paolucci (28) –
was rejected by Eco,  who feared the nihilism involved in an infinite  and groundless 
process  of  mediation  (28).  The  theory  of  ‘primary  iconism’  was  therefore  first
elaborated to fulfill  the need of a ‘ground’  of  reality.  While keeping to the label  of
‘primary iconism,’ Eco now explains this concept in a quite different way, namely as
“what cannot be avoided when a subject – an interpretant subject – enters the semiotic
process”  (32).  What  cannot  be  avoided  is  something  that  pertains  equally  to  the
subject’s cognitive system and to the external world at a given instant t. Eco concludes:
“even if primary iconism does not exist cosmologically, it still exists for the subject” (33).
To use a Peircean phrase,  reality pertains more to ‘the outward clash’  than to ‘the
outward’ itself. 
8 A different strategy to approach Peirce’s concept of reality (and truth) is to be found in
the anthropological  shift towards practice and agency that the pragmatic perspective
encourages us to assume. This is precisely the attitude that is explored in the rest of the
volume.  Among  the  introductory  essays,  Fabbrichesi  applies  her  anthropological
commitment to an account of the self as derivate: the self is not the ground but rather
the  product  of  its  own  actions  and  choices.  Therefore,  it  becomes  possible  to
distinguish two aspects of being a person, namely personality and individuality.  While
personality is the series of actions sewed into habits and, as it were, embroidered into
the larger fabric of the world, individuality is the still unrelated thing, similar to the
thread that may be hanging from the unfinished embroidery. 
9 Calcaterra’s contribution (“Epistemology of the Self”) further elaborates on the notion
of  the  agent  subject  from  the  perspective  of  the  subject’s  external  construction.
Accordingly, the great innovation of Peirce is his complete dismissal of the dualism
between an “internal” and an “external” self, which had permeated the philosophical
discourse since Descartes (59). The dualism is eliminated by denying any originality or
foundational role to the “internal” side, which becomes an inferential product of the
active agent. The construction of the self is achieved through the experience of error 
(there must be someone who is wrong – I am wrong; 61) and the testimony of the others
(“Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man,” 1868, EP 1).
10 In Brioschi’s essay “The Notion of Reality in Peirce: Between Expectation and Surprise”
the real – as Calcaterra’s self – is a derived notion, that may be discovered through its
opposite: namely, illusion (82). However, unlike the self which can indeed be built out
of false testimony, the real seems to advance a stronger claim towards truth (in the
Massimo A. Bonfantini, Rossella Fabbrichesi, Salvatore Zingale (a cura di), S...
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VIII-2 | 2016
3
long run): first, by resisting our attempts at thinking arbitrarily of it; and, secondly, by
being the object  toward which any inquiry,  if  pursued fairly  and long enough,  will
ultimately converge. However, Brioschi notices, there may be a problem in defending
those two theses at the same time (88). Intuitively, in order to resist us, something must
at least be present to us; however, the truth and the real are to be discovered at the end
of the process of inquiry – that is, in the future. Brioschi shows that the two theses can
be reconciled, provided that reality is defined through the anthropological analysis of
the  structure  of  expectation and  surprise.  Expectation  and  surprise  are  not  simply
feelings but rather logical attitudes; following Maddalena (2003), Brioschi relates them to
the  metaphysical  categories  of  Thirdness  and  Secondness  respectively.  While
Thirdness, showing the regularity of natural laws, grounds expectation, Secondness, that
is the subject’s clash with its object, is the metaphysical name for surprise. 
11 Maddalena’s discussion of the anti-Kantianism of Peirce (“Peirce, anti-Kantianism, and
the synthetic  meaning of  pragmatism”) has several  facets,  which are probably best
illustrated in his recent The Philosophy of Gesture (2015). I survey the one more closely
related  to  the  anthropological  leaning  of  the  book.  According  to  Maddalena,
“experience as continuity” (71) is the common element to all pragmatism. Experience
and common sense are opposed to “intellectualism,” as shown in the Peircean critique
of  Cartesianism.  Indeed,  Maddalena  argues,  since  Kantianism  is  a  form  of
intellectualism, and since the anti-intellectual attitude is constitutive of both Peirce’s
and the pragmatic movement, then by adopting pragmatism one should dispose of Kant
and of Descartes at once. This reading of Kant’s philosophy – and of its relation with
Peirce’s – is not without critics, especially because Peirce claims to have derived the
very term ‘pragmatism’ from Kant (“What pragmatism is,” 1905; EP2: 333) and to value
Kant for  his  practical  philosophy more than for  his  epistemology.  The most  serious
critic to Maddalena’s views is probably Gava (2014). Although Maddalena acknowledges
Gava’s criticism of his anti-Kantian reading of Peirce, he does not engage directly with
Gava’s argument here. It would be productive for the Peirce community if Maddalena
and Gava could give more visibility to their respective positions in a published form.
12 The two contributions by Stango (“The Logic of Ontological Recognition”) and Paolucci
(“Logic of Relatives, Semiotics, and Phenomenology”) provide some suggestions on how
the  connection  between  logical  thought  and  the  world  can  be  established  and
cultivated. Stango’s ‘logic of ontological recognition’ has the notion of ‘object’ (or of ‘it’)
at its core, namely the problem of how the object is recognised as ‘what it is’ by the
knowing  subject.  Paolucci’s  contribution  is  also  focused  on  the  role  of  objects  in
Peirce’s logic: the passage from the logic of relatives to semiotics is based on the idea
that the logic is a logic of relations between objects, as exemplified by chemical models.
The  logic  of  relatives  thus  breaks  with  the  traditional  form  of  propositional  logic,
proposing  a  diagrammatic  (instead  of  a  sequential)  style  of  reasoning.  Those  two
contributions can be seen also as a critical reaction to Eco’s theory of ‘primary iconism.’
13 Fadda’s  essay,  “Peirce  and  Languages,”  is  concerned  with  the  role  that  “natural,
historic” languages play in Peircean semiotics, that is the overlap of cultural and of
biological dispositions for language in the human animal (127). Fadda proceeds from
here outlining the project  to apply Peirce’s  categories of  semiotics,  which certainly
have a broader concern than language-use, back to linguistics and towards a broader,
mostly communicative and visual understanding of language (131), as opposed to the
‘logocentrism’ of Saussure. 
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14 From the ‘dialogical’ section, only Facchi (“From Peirce to Vailati”) and Petrilli (“Peirce
and Welby”) develop this dialogue from a historical perspective. Martone advances a
possible point of contact with Saussure on the notion of the metaphor, and Caputo
pushes the linguistic engagement of Peirce’s thought towards Hjelmselv. A contiguity is
found in their mathematical fathers (194), as well as in the role of experience in the
semantic content (197). Overall, those contributions fall outside of the discussion of a
‘pragmatist anthropology’ and engage in a philosophical dialogue with other thinkers
and traditions of thought.
15 The last section of the book contains instances of application of Peirce’s theories to
contemporary subjects or problems. The essays I shall focus on are those of Goldoni,
Proni, and Zingale.
16 Goldoni  (“Inhabiting  the  Improvisation”)  connects  the  musical  tradition  of  jazz
improvisation with the ability to ‘improvise’ in life gained by experience and built into
a sharable, social language (245). Proni (“From Peirce to Sennet: Pragmatism and the
Project [of living]” argues that both Peirce and Sennet advance a new concept of human
experience.  Being  experienced  goes  hand  in  hand  with  being  aware  of  one’s  own
actions, and this awareness brings “skill and dexterity” (255) to the agent, who thus
becomes “craftsman” of her own actions. This craftsmanship is recognised as a value to
be preserved in the alienated contemporary world. Despite the fact that a personal skill
is usually not easily transferable to a community, Proni maintains that craftsmanship’s
skills are suitable to be developed socially. This new kind of “shared craftsmanship”
unites  individual  and social  planning,  interpersonal  relations  and logic  of  scientific
discovery,  as  well  as  a  still  to  be  formulated “guidelines  for  the  [optimal]  project”
(255). This vision, albeit seeming more Utopian than ‘applied’ Peirce, remains open for
further development. 
17 Finally,  Zingale (“This is  my design:  the Space of  Abduction in Planning”) connects
design  as  “a  cultural  and  historical  form  […]  of  planned  action”  (258)  with  the
abductive inference stimulated by the “irritation of doubt.” As Brioschi’s reality was
suspended between expectation and surprise, here abduction stems from a particular
uneasiness  or  cause  of  concern  with  what  is  given.  Moreover,  the  “planning
imagination,” which is set into motion by concern, is what allows one to “conceive an
object,  i.e.  an  artifact,”  only  together  with its  possible  effects  (263).  Indeed  this
conception is open, and future planning may lead to further effects and therefore to
different  objects.  This  pragmatic  perspective  allows  Zingale  to  introduce  a  very
situated,  and  semiotically  grounded  concept  of  design.  Zingale’s  awareness  of  the
relation  that  an  object  has  with  its  environment  as  well  as  with  the  cultural  and
historical contingency of its users shows a scenario of truly applied pragmatic concepts
in the light of a pragmatic anthropology. 
18 To conclude, Su Peirce is a very ambitious volume, which captures a relevant part of
Peirce’s scholarship in Italy, plus an estimate of how appealing Peirce’s thought can be
for  contemporary  reflections  on  society  and  on  community,  as  well  as  for  other
academic disciplines. 
19 As  Fabbrichesi  writes  (55),  Peirce  has  not  met  the  destiny  of  the  other  classical
pragmatists. William James (1842-1910), John Dewey (1859-1952) and George Herbert
Mead  (1863-1931)  have  today  been  appropriated  by  different  fields  (psychology,
education  theory,  and  sociology  respectively),  while Peirce  remains  an  author  ‘for
everyone and nobody,’ whose work continually awakes the attention of scholars from
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the  most  different  backgrounds.  Su  Peirce will  therefore  appeal  to  a  wide  range  of
scholars,  and may set the agenda for further studies in Peirce’s scholarship and its
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